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Abstract
We investigate whether defensive lending and defensive granting motivated the
transfer of resources by oﬃcial donors to low income countries. We estimate a
dynamic panel of 75 low-income IDA and IDA-Blend countries for the period 1982
to 2008, where the sample includes 41 HIPC and a control group of other 34 low-
income countries. Our results point to no evidence of defensive lending as opposed to
strong evidence of defensive granting. Both bilateral and multilateral donors reduce
their loans as the debt they hold increases (where such “correction” is actually
weaker in the case of multilateral loans to HIPC). Oﬃcial donors provide more
grants as multilateral debt increases where this eﬀect is signiﬁcant only for debt-
ridden HIPC countries. This result is consistent with a substitution of grants for
loans and the new approach to debt sustainability, but questions the eﬃciency and
selectivity of the aid policy.
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11 Introduction
The aid architecture for low-income countries has been substantially redesigned over the
last decade. Debt relief initiatives, such as the HIPC and MDRI initiatives, have become a
cornerstone of the new strategy. Indeed, the consensus view has emerged within the donor
community that poor countries’ debt write-oﬀs are a precondition for a more eﬀective aid
policy, while the debate has moved to the loans versus grants controversy (e.g., Bulow
and Rogoﬀ, 2005; Radelet, 2005; Cohen et al. 2007; Johansson, 2010). The assessment
of debt relief, however, is much more controversial among economists as witnessed by the
large theoretical and empirical literature that discusses arguments in favor and against
debt relief. A strong argument in favor of debt relief is that it removes the creditors’
incentives to engage in defensive lending, that is to provide new loans (and aid) to allow
debt-ridden countries to reﬁnance their debt service obligations and avoid default.
Indeed, one of the explanations for the (overall) disappointing results on the eﬀective-
ness of the HIPC Initiative lies with the providers of concessional loans and grants who did
not do enough to ensure that such transfers were eﬃciently allocated across countries and
eﬃciently invested by recipient countries.1 Therefore, defensive lending may explain why
debt relief have been preferred to other formso fa i d( i th a sl i t t l eo rn oc o s t-M i c h a e l o w a
(2003)) and, more importantly, why the eﬀects of debt relief, both in terms of growth
and long-term ﬁscal sustainability, have been limited so far. To the extent that loans
and grants are motivated by defensive lending, a main advantage of debt relief is that of
increasing the transparency of aid policy possibly inducing a greater future selectivity by
donors and lenders.
Although this theoretical argument is now fairly well established, the extent to which
defensive lending had, in fact, distorted the allocation of aid ultimately remains an empir-
ical issue. The aim of this paper is to examine whether bilateral and multilateral donors
2engaged in defensive lending (and defensive granting) by looking at aid ﬂows, i.e., con-
cessional loans and grants, to low-income IDA and IDA-Blend countries over the period
1982-2008. In particular, we examine whether defensive lending (and granting) distorted
ﬁnancial assistance in favor of HIPC countries.
Despite its popularity, the defensive lending hypothesis has received scant attention
in the empirical literature on the determinants of aid ﬂows. Bird and Milne (2003) ﬁnd
evidence of a positive correlation between external debt and aid (loans plus grants). Most
contributions, however, focus on the relationship between the disbursements of new loans
(gross of repayments) and total debt service, i.e., the sum of interest and principal repay-
ments. Lerrick (2005) and Ratha (2005) ﬁnd a positive correlation between new loans and
total debt service. Cohen and Reisen (2007) show that this correlation is stronger in the
case of multilateral loans than for bilateral and private loans. Geginat and Kraay (2007)
also ﬁnd a strong correlation between IDA loans and service payments on outstanding
IDA debt, but provide several arguments why this correlation should not be interpreted
as evidence of defensive lending.
U s i n gad i ﬀerent approach, Birdsall et al. (2003) investigate whether high debt levels
were a main determinant of net resource ﬂows to Sub-Saharan African countries over
the period 1978-98. Unlike in other studies, Birdsall at al. consider loans net of interest
and principal repayments and, realizing that grants can be used to free resources in the
recipients’ budget to service the debt, they focus on net transfers, i.e., on the sum of grants
and net loans. They ﬁnd that net transfers were higher in poorer and smaller countries,
but the quality of their economic policy mattered little in explaining net transfers, as
donors, especially bilaterals, made greater transfers to countries with high multilateral
debt, despite their bad policies. Finally, Devarajan et al. (1999) provide evidence that
30% of aid in the period 1975-99 has been used to service the external debt. This evidence
suggests that a “defensive granting” hypothesis should be investigated as well.
3In this paper, we further investigate whether defensive lending and defensive granting
motivated the transfer of resources by oﬃcial donors to low income countries by estimating
the eﬀect of debt and its composition by type of creditors on net loans and grants, while
controlling for economic performance and institutions and for country characteristics.
More speciﬁcally, we estimate a dynamic panel of 75 low-income IDA and IDA-Blend
countries for the period 1982 to 2008, where the sample includes 41 HIPC countries and
a control group of other 34 low-income countries. This allows us to examine whether
the allocation of net loans and grants to HIPC has been diﬀerent compared to other
low-income countries. Our contribution to the related literature is threefold.
First of all we provide a more rigorous test of defensive lending. A main problem
in investigating whether defensive lending has motivated aid ﬂows to highly indebted
countries is the lack of a theoretical deﬁnition that can be tested empirically. In Section 3
we motivate our choice of considering loans net of interest and principal repayments and
we show that the reaction of net loans to debt provides a simple test of defensive lending.
Then, although we focus- as Birdsall et al. (2003)- on net resource ﬂows and distin-
guish between multilateral and bilateral donors, we examine net loans and grants sepa-
rately. Indeed, despite oﬃcial loans to low income countries are, in most cases, conces-
sional and, as such, a part of aid, they are inherently diﬀerent from grants, if anything
because loans must be repaid.
Finally, the use of a dynamic panel is new in this kind of analysis and allows us
to reach more accurate and robust conclusions regarding the behavior of bilateral and
multilateral institutions. Indeed, a strong dependence of net loans and grants from the
level of debt, in the static speciﬁcation, might simply reﬂect the autocorrelation of loans
and grants that are typically disbursed in a number of installments over time.
Our results point to no evidence of defensive lending as opposed to strong evidence of
4defensive granting. Both bilateral and multilateral donors reduce their loans as the debt
they hold increases (where such “correction” is actually weaker in the case of multilateral
loans to HIPC). Oﬃcial donors provide more grants as multilateral debt increases where
this eﬀect is signiﬁcant only for debt-ridden HIPC countries. This result is consistent
with a substitution of grants for loans and the new approach to debt sustainability, but
questions the eﬃciency and selectivity of the aid policy (i.e., debt is an important driver
of aid).
Estimating the same model over a reduced sample, which includes the years before
the start of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative (1982-1999), which marks the beginning of a
greater eﬀort in debt reduction, we ﬁnd some (albeit weak) evidence of defensive lending
(and conﬁrm the evidence on defensive granting). As in Birdsall et al. (2003) we ﬁnd
that higher multilateral debt increases bilateral net loans to HIPC, despite their bad
policy, while multilateral net loans decrease as multilateral debt share increase but such
“correction” is smaller for HIPC (as in the full sample).2 Furthermore, comparing the
results of the two samples, we do not ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences concerning the changes
in the sensitivity of the aid allocation policy with respect to poverty, the debt burden or
the quality of policies and institutions (as measured by the CPIA index).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some descriptive evidence on
net loans and grants while in Section 3 we present a more rigorous deﬁnition of defensive
lending. Section 4 develops the empirical framework and the results are discussed in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Loans and grants: descriptive evidence
To estimate the net transfers that debtor countries received over the years we must ex-
amine the evolution of net loans, that is, the diﬀerence between new loans and total debt
5service (i.e., the sum of interests and principal repayments). We call this diﬀerence net
loans instead of net transfers (which is the deﬁnition provided by the Global Development
Finance, GDF) to make clear that net loans do not include grants, which are the other
important source of funds to low-income countries. To provide further insight, net loans
can be distinguished by type of creditors.3 To this end, we focus on the distribution of
long-term net loans, since the GDF statistics of the World Bank provides disaggregated
d a t ao n l yf o rt h i st y p eo fl o a n s .
Long-term net loans to HIPC, disaggregated by type of creditors, are displayed in
Figure 1.4 Both bilateral and private net loans started decreasing since the beginning of
the eighties. While private net loans were negative almost throughout the whole period
(they became positive in second half of the new millennium), bilateral net loans became
negative in the mid nineties (and positive again only in the last year of the sample).
Positive long-term net loans to HIPC were then ensured by multilateral organizations.
International ﬁnancial institutions played a crucial role in maintaining a positive ﬂow of
funds to HIPC. In turn, multilateral net loans decreased dramatically after the second
half of the 2000s (corresponding with their greater involvement in debt relief initiatives
after the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, in 1999).5
Figure 1: HIPC: Net Loans (percent of GDP) - Country Average
A full picture of net resource ﬂows from the international community to HIPC requires
examining grants, which represent the most important component of foreign aid and a
clear alternative to net loans as a source of funding for HIPC.6 Figure 2 presents the
evolution of grants (net of debt forgiveness and technical cooperation) disaggregated by
type of donors, which are provided by the Development Assistance Committee of the
OECD, as the GDF statistics of the World Bank does not contain such a distinction.7
Over the last two decades, grants have clearly been the most important transfers
6to HIPC. As grants kept rising until the mid nineties, they compensated the fall in net
loans over the period between 1984 and 1997, making stable the “total resources inﬂow”.
Bilateral and multilateral grants show a similar pattern: both had been rising since the
eighties, then they fell substantially in the second half of the nineties to start increasing
again since the early 2000s.8 Evidence on net loans and grants clearly shows that bilateral
creditors, unlike private creditors who pulled out from HIPC, agreed to switch from loans
to grants. Figure 2 conﬁrms that bilateral grants continued to ﬂow into these countries,
thereby compensating for the fall of net loans.
Figure 2: HIPC: Grants (percent of GDP) - Country Average
Figure 3 shows the evolution of debt ratios of HIPC disaggregated by type of credi-
tors. While private debt was quite stable (and low throughout the whole period), Figure
3 documents a rise in oﬃcial debt ratios between 1988 and 1994. After 1994, bilateral
debt started to steadily decrease while multilateral debt began to fall only ten years later.
The rising debt held by multilateral organizations replaced the amount of debt held by
other creditors.
Figure 3: HIPC: Debt (percent of GDP) - Country Average
This debt increase is surprising, as it occurred at a time when bilateral oﬃcial cred-
itors pledged to reduce the burden of poor debtor countries under the “Toronto terms”
(1988), “London terms” (1991) and “Naples terms” (1994). In fact, traditional debt
rescheduling did reduce the net present value of debtors obligations (e.g., see Daseking
and Powell, 1999) but the eﬀective “relief” was modest and certainly below expecta-
tions. More importantly, in the same years, debt relief was oﬀset by a greater amount of
new (multilateral) borrowing and grants. This raises the issue of whether resources have
been moved away from the indebted countries to their international creditors (negative
transfers) or resources have continued to ﬂow into and beneﬁt these countries (positive
7transfers).9
This evidence certainly raises the issue of what motivated the increasing involvement
of multilateral organizations in the HIPC debt problem. Humanitarian reasons certainly
provide a possible explanation. A second explanation is that a substitution of multilateral
for bilateral debt may increase the leverage of the international community on the HIPC.
Indeed, multilateral loans are conditional on the adoption of reforms and adjustment
programmes and multilateral organizations are senior creditors because default on their
debt may lead to the exclusion from future lending and from other forms of aid. Finally,
the behavior of multilateral creditors can be explained by “defensive lending”. Multilateral
organizations may have intervened with the main goal of avoiding default and thus the
“embarrassment” of losses in their budgets and failure of aid policy.
3 How to Measure Defensive Lending
A main problem in investigating whether defensive lending has motivated aid ﬂows to
highly indebted countries is the lack of a theoretical deﬁnition that can be tested empir-
ically. Defensive lending is usually deﬁned as the practice of providing new loans (and
grants) to allow the borrower to reﬁnance existing debt-service obligations with the aim
of avoiding default. According to this deﬁnition, Geginat and Kraay (2007) claim that
defensive lending implies that new loan disbursements should be equal to the total debt
service, and thus argue in favor of estimating gross loan disbursements as a function of
total debt service, as done in Ratha (2005) and Cohen and Reisen (2007).
This approach is, however, unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First of all, de-
tecting a positive correlation between new loans and total debt service does not provide a
direct test of defensive lending and may not be very informative. For instance, some pos-
itive correlation may naturally arises as new debt is issued to ﬁnance maturing liabilities
8without necessarily implying Ponzi scheme ﬁnancing. Morever, this correlation would be
sensitive, for any given debt level, to its maturity distribution and its cost. This raises the
issue of how strong should be the correlation of new loans to the debt service for lending
to be deemed defensive Although Geginat and Kraay (2007) argue that new loans should
move one to one with the total debt service, it is easy to see that this may not be the case.
By deﬁnition, new loan disbursements, LDt, are equal to the current debt stock, inclusive
of new loans, Bt, and the stock of unmatured debt carried over from the previous period,
BU
t−1,t h a ti s
LDt ≡ Bt − B
U
t−1, (1)
while debt evolves according to the following equation:




t−1 + Xt − Gt − FDI t (2)
where, it−1Bt−1 are the interest payments, BM
t−1 is the debt maturing in the current period,
Xt is the primary (trade) deﬁcit, Gt a r eg r a n t sa n dFDI t is foreign direct investment.
Then, combining equations (1) and (2) shows that new loan disbursements are equal
to:
LDt = it−1Bt−1 + B
M
t−1 + Xt − Gt − FDIt (3)
Equation (3) suggests that if FDI and/or grants, Gt,a r es u ﬃciently high to cover the
primary (trade) deﬁcit, Xt,a n dﬁnance part of the total debt service, it−1Bt−1 + BM
t−1,
then a defensive strategy can be implemented by providing an amount of new loans lower
than the debt service. By contrast, supposing that new loans are equal to the total debt
service, the nominal debt stock will grow at a rate equal to the nominal interest rate i
and the debt-to-GDP ratio will grow at the rate rt−1 = it−1 − γt,w h e r eγt is the rate
of growth of nominal GDP (in dollars). Then, if nominal growth were higher than the
(concessional) cost of debt service, a roll over policy would set the debt-to-GDP ratio on
a sustainable decreasing path and should not be stigmatized as defensive lending.
9To overcome this problem we focus on net loans, Lt = LDt − it−1Bt−1 − BM
t−1 (i.e.,
new loans net of interests and principal repayments) and rely on the approach to debt
sustainability proposed by Bohn (1998, 2005). Substituting the deﬁnition of net loans in
equation (1), and measuring all variables relative to GDP, we have that the debt-to-GDP
ratio is equal to
Bt =( 1+rt−1)Bt−1 + Lt (4)
As shown by Bohn, a suﬃcient condition for debt sustainability is that net loans Lt (the
primary deﬁcit) react negatively to the stock of debt Bt−1. This suggests to estimate the
following simple reaction of net loans (relative to GDP) to the debt ratio:
Lt = −ρBt−1 (5)
A negative reaction, ρ>0, of net loans to the stock of debt is is a suﬃcient condition
for debt sustainability in that it makes the debt grow at a slower rate than rt,i . e .Bt =
(1 + rt−1 − ρ)Bt−1, and thus ensures that the transversality, No-Ponzi game, condition
holds.
As no reaction of net loans to debt, should be expected under defensive lending, the
null hypothesis that the debt coeﬃcient is ρ =0provides a simple test of the defensive
lending hypothesis. Moreover, the point estimate of the debt coeﬃcient, ρ,i ne q u a t i o n
(5), oﬀers a simple measure of the extent of the correction that can be easily compared to
the real (net of growth) interest rate rt to assess the extent of debt stabilization eﬀorts.
4 A Model of Net Loans and Grants Determination
In this section we examine the determinants of net loans and grants provided by multilat-
eral and bilateral donors to IDA and IDA-blend countries focusing, in particular, on the
role of debt and its composition by type of creditors. Unlike in Birdsall et al. (2003) who
10focus on aggregate net transfers, we consider loans and grants separately, explicitly recog-
nizing that loans are inherently diﬀe r e n tf r o mg r a n t si nt h a tl o a n sm u s tb er e p a i d .D a t a
on loans are from the GDF statistics of the World Bank; data on grants come from the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. Further details on our variable
deﬁnitions and sources and some descriptive statistics are reported in the Appendix.
We consider new loans net of interest and principal repayments that are referred to
as “net transfers on external debt” in the GDF statistics. Net loans give the amount
of disbursements that are left to the borrowers once they have paid for the service of
their debts. Hence, we take into account the fact that most of the new credit ﬂows back
to the creditors in the form of interests and principal repayments. As we abstract from
any gross lending made with the purpose of allowing the borrowers to fulﬁl their debt
payment obligations, we take for granted the positive correlation between gross loans and
total debt service found in previous studies and investigate whether net loans decrease
with the level of debt. As shown in Section 3, the absence of a negative reaction of net
loans to debt (or a positive one) can be taken as evidence of defensive lending.
We restrict our attention to long-term loans (and debt) because data on the distri-
bution by type of creditors are not available for short-term debt, which is, however, a
minor component of total debt.10 We take grants, disaggregated by type of donors, net
of both technical cooperation and total debt forgiven. We exclude technical cooperation
from total grants because it is the least fungible form of aid and thus unlikely to free
budget resources for debt service. We also exclude debt forgiven because its motivation
is clearly opposite to defensive lending.11 Moreover, debt forgiveness, though classiﬁed as
grant in the DAC-OECD statistics, does not free up a corresponding amount of resources
to be used in the immediate future, but only the debt service.(i.e., the interests and the
amount of debt to be redeemed in that period).
We estimate a dynamic panel of 75 IDA and IDA-Blend countries for the period 1982
11to 2008 with both country-speciﬁce ﬀects and time eﬀects. The sample includes 41 HIPC
countries and a control group of other 34 low-income countries (listed in the Appendix).12
This allows us to test for possible diﬀerences in the behavior of oﬃcial donors regarding
their allocation of aid to HIPC as compared to other low-income countries. The reason
we start our analysis in 1982 is that the debt crisis of the early 1980s arguably marked a
shift in regime. We also estimate our model over a reduced sample, that is over the period
1982-1999. The HIPC Initiative was strengthened in 1999, the year 1999 then marks a
change in the debt strategy towards a greater eﬀo r ti nd e b tr e d u c t i o n .
We choose a dynamic speciﬁcation —i.e., we include a lag of the dependent variable
among the regressors— to account for the short run dynamics of net loans and grants that
are typically disbursed in a number of installments over time. The dynamic speciﬁcation
allows for a correct estimation of the eﬀect of high debt levels by controlling for the
autocorrelation of net loans and grants.13










i,t−1 + c2Bi,t−1 + c3Zi,t−1 + c4Ci + c5Tt (7)
where L
j
i,t denotes net long-term loans (relative to GDP) to country i from creditor j (i.e.,
bilateral or multilateral creditors) and the variable G
j
i,t denotes grants (relative to GDP)
to country i from donor j (i.e., bilateral or multilateral donors) and Gi,t the grants from
the other donor.
To examine the relation between aid policy and indebtedness, we consider the stock
of long-term debt (relative to GDP) owed to bilateral, multilateral and private creditors
and enter the three debt-to-GDP ratios separately (Bi,t−1 is the vector of the stocks of
long-term debt held by multilateral, bilateral and private creditors). We thus estimate
the reaction of net loans (and grants) by a given oﬃcial creditor to the debt share held
12by this creditor and to the debt shares held by others. While a sustainable debt strategy
envisages a reduction of net loans as the debt ratio increases, no reaction (or a positive
one) should instead be expected in the case of defensive lending.
In order to distinguish the “defensive lending” hypothesis from other motivations
for providing aid, such as. poverty reduction and aid eﬀectiveness, we consider a set of
variables Zi,t−1 that are standard in the empirical literature. To account for poverty
reduction and humanitarian reasons we include real per-capita GDP (measured according
to PPP), real GDP growth and population.14 Note that GDP growth should actually
matter both in the case loans and grants were motivated by humanitarian reasons and in
the case they were given to enhance the eﬀectiveness of aid in stimulating development.
In the latter case grants and loans are expected to positively depend on past economic
performance (e.g., due to good policies and institutions). But low growth could also
lead to higher loans and grants if aid was motivated by humanitarian reasons. As aid
eﬀectiveness has long been shown to depend on the quality of policy and institutions of
recipient countries, we also include the CPIA index of the World Bank, which reﬂects the
Bank’s internal evaluation of country performance and institutions.
Since the CPIA index does not exhaust the list of variables that possibly capture
the quality of policies and institutions, we tried to include some other variables in the
regression. More speciﬁcally, we included the rate of inﬂation and openness (i.e., the
sum of imports and exports relative to GDP), as other possible determinants of policy
performance, and the index of “Political Rights and Civil Liberties as another control for
the quality of the institutions. While these additional variables were not signiﬁcant at
conventional levels, our main results are not aﬀected by their inclusion (either including or
excluding the CPIA index). Finally, we also controlled for whether a country votes (more
or less) in line with the United States (or with key G7 countries) in the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) and we included a dummy for temporary UNSC membership
13as other (political) determinants of aid and oﬃcial loans.15 While both voting in line with
the U.S. (and key G7 countries) and the UNSC dummy are not signiﬁcant at conventional
levels, the results for the remaining variables are unchanged.16
Finally, the countries dummies, Ci, control for country-speciﬁc ﬁxed characteristics.
We also expect them to capture motivations related to donors’ political and strategic
interests, which are traditional in the aid literature, such as colonial past, religion, ethnic
and geographic variables (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 2003). The time dummies, Tt, control
for common macroeconomic factors, such as the time variation in the amount of available
resources for development assistance.
In studying whether the allocation of aid was distorted by defensive lending and/or
defensive granting, we distinguish between HIPC and non-HIPC countries. Since an
unsustainable debt is a main condition to qualify for the HIPC Initiative, incentives for
defensive lending should be greatest in the case of these countries. On the other hand, if
creditors aimed at reducing their exposure to default risk, then their reaction should be
greater at high levels of debt, as relevant non-linearities could characterize their reaction
functions. In this case, the negative reaction of net loans to debt should be stronger for
highly indebted HIPC countries. Hence, the HIPC condition is a natural treatment in
testing the defensive lending hypothesis.
To investigate whether the allocation of net loans and grants changes when the level
of debt is high and unsustainable (as in the case of HIPC), we allow the eﬀect of debt
on donors’ decisions to be diﬀerent in the case of HIPC and non-HIPC countries. We do
so by interacting the debt (relative to GDP) owed to multilateral, bilateral and private
creditors with two dummies; a dummy Hi,t a k i n gt h ev a l u eo fo n ei nt h ec a s eo faH I P C
country and a dummy NHi taking the value of one in the case of a non-HIPC country.
The coeﬃcients on the interacted debt ratios allow to examine whether the reaction of
net loans and grants has been diﬀe r e n tf o rt h et w oc o u n t r yg r o u p s .I ta l s oa l l o w st ot e s t
14for a diﬀerential treatment of HIPC relative to non-HIPC by creditors and donors.










i,t−1 + c2HiBi,t−1 + c3NHiBi,t−1 + c4Zi,t−1 + c5Ci + c6Tt (9)
4.1 The estimation method
We use a GLS ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator in order to correct for heteroskedasticity across coun-
tries and control for both countries unobservables and common macroeconomic factors.
We choose a dynamic speciﬁcation, including one lag of the dependent variable among
the regressors, to account for the short run dynamics of net loans and grants that are
typically disbursed in a number of installments over time. In the case of loans, controlling
for their lagged value also removes the correlation between current loans and previous
period debt that may possibly arise because previous period loans are accumulated in the
stock of debt.
In a dynamic panel with country ﬁxed-eﬀects the lagged dependent variable is cor-
related with the country-speciﬁc component of the error term and, as result, the GLS
ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator produces biased estimates. Nickell (1981) has however shown that
in the AR(1) case the bias in estimating a dynamic ﬁxed-eﬀects model becomes less im-
portant as T increases. Judson and Owen (1999) test the performance of the ﬁxed eﬀects
estimator by means of Monte Carlo simulations, concentrating on panels with typical
macroeconomic dimensions, i.e., small N and T. Their analysis suggest that the ﬁxed-
eﬀects estimator performs well when T=30, that is with a time dimension close to ours
(T=27).
The ﬁxed eﬀects assumes homoskedasticity and if the assumption is not met then
the estimates will be ineﬃcient. A groupwise likelihood ratio heteroskedasticity test was
15performed on the residuals of the baseline model estimated by OLS. The test is chi-squared
distributed with N-1 degrees of freedom, where N is the number of groups in the sample,
75 countries in our case. The result of the test led to a rejection of the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity across groups for both net loans and grants regressions.
Baltagi and Li (1995) suggest an LM test for serial correlation in ﬁxed eﬀects models
where the asymptotic distributions of the test statistics is calculated for large T. Under
two alternative assumptions for the error autocorrelation structure (i.e. an AR(1) and a
MA(1)) the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the disturbance is rejected in one
equations out of four. In any case, the size of the autocorrelation coeﬃcient is negligible for
all equations. Hence, we decided not to correct for the autocorrorrelation in the residuals




The results of the estimation of equation (6) for both bilateral and multilateral net loans
( r e l a t i v et oG D P )a r ep r e s e n t e di nt h eﬁrst two columns of Table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
We start by considering the whole sample of IDA and Blend countries without distin-
guishing them into HIPC and non HIPC (as in Table 2 and 3). As expected, net loans are
rather persistent, while the variables related to recipients’ needs (per capita GDP) and
economic performance (GDP growth) are not signiﬁcant. The eﬀect of the CPIA index
varies depending on the type of creditors considered. Consistently with other results in
the literature, a good policy performance (in terms of the CPIA score) favors multilateral
lending: column 2 of Table 1 shows that the CPIA index has a positive eﬀect on multilat-
16eral loans and this eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.17 By contrast, column 1 of Table
1 shows that a higher CPIA score signiﬁcantly lowers net loans from bilateral creditors,
where this coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Furthermore, bigger countries do
receive larger multilateral loans as opposed to bilateral loans which are unaﬀected by a
country’ population.18
The important evidence, however, concerns the eﬀect of the debt (relative to GDP),
that we divide into bilateral, multilateral and private debt depending on the holder’s type.
Column 1 shows that both bilateral and multilateral creditors have been reducing loans
exposure with the corresponding increase in oﬃcial debt, while oﬃcial net loans have
positively reacted to private debt shares. An increase in private debt (as documented in
the descriptive statistics) may represent an increase in the credibility and attractiveness
of low income countries to private creditors.
Estimates of the grant equation (7) for both bilateral and multilateral grants (relative
to GDP) are presented in column 3 and 4 of Table 1. The high and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
of the lagged dependent variables show that both bilateral and multilateral grants are
highly persistent. Both bilateral and multilateral grants are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the
variables related to recipients’ needs: as columns 3 and 4 show, lower GDP growth and
lower per capita GDP signiﬁcantly aﬀect grants. The strong intervention of oﬃcial donors
in low growth environments is evidence of the importance of recipients’ need motivations in
their aid policy. Interestingly, and contrary to other results in the empirical literature (e.g.
Burnside and Dollar, 2000, Collier and Dollar, 2002), policy performance and institutions,
as measured by the CPIA index, does not seem to be a relevant factor of either bilateral
or multilateral aid.
As debt variables are concerned, we can observe that debt is a signiﬁcant driver
of aid. Speciﬁcally, we can detect a similar pattern in both bilateral and multilateral
donors who have both allocated more grants to countries with a higher multilateral debt
17independently of their economic performance and institutions quality. Finally, multilateral
grants also rise with a higher private debt, conﬁrming what found before in the case of
loans.19 This sensitivity of both multilateral and bilateral aid with respect to multilateral
debt, together with the total irrelevance of the CPIA indicator in the regression, casts
some serious doubts on the selectivity of donors’ aid policy, as conﬁrmed in the results
discussed in the section below.
We ﬁnally checked the robustness of our results by employing alternative speciﬁca-
tions and concluded that our ﬁndings are robust to diﬀerent estimation methods (see
Table A4 in the Appendix).20
5.2 HIPC versus non-HIPC
The results of the estimation of equation (8) for both bilateral and multilateral net loans
( r e l a t i v et oG D P )a r ep r e s e n t e di nTable 2.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
As the coeﬃcients of the control variables have the same sign and signiﬁcance level
than those presented in Table 1 above, we focus here on the important evidence concerning
the eﬀects of the debt shares distinguishing between HIPC and non-HIPC countries.
In both column 1 and 2 of Table 2, debt ownership appears to be an important
determinant of the lending decisions of oﬃcial creditors. While bilateral lenders did
reduce their loans as their debt share increases, without distinguishing between HIPC
and non-HIPC, multilateral lenders’ “correction,” with respect to their own share, is
much lower in the case of HIPC as compared to countries which are not HIPC (for which
debt sustainability should not be a problem). Moreover, in their lending decision, bilateral
lenders are not aﬀected by the multilateral debt share, while multilateral loans decrease
with the quota of bilateral debt stock held by the HIPC (without being aﬀected by the
18debt stock held by non-HIPC). Furthermore, bilateral loans increase with the stock of debt
held by private creditors (as in Table 1 above), while multilateral lenders now positively
react only to the amount of private debt held by non-HIPC.
Overall, this evidence provides no support to the hypothesis of defensive lending by
bilateral lenders and very little support to the hypothesis of defensive lending as the main
motivation for the behavior of multilateral organizations.
The picture is totally diﬀe r e n tw h e nw et u r nt ot h ea n a l y s i so ft h ed e t e r m i n a n t s
of bilateral and multilateral grants. Estimates of the grant equation (9) are presented
in column 3 and 4 of Table 2 for both bilateral and multilateral grants. Again, as the
coeﬃcients of the control variables have the same sign and signiﬁcance level than those
of Table 1 above, we focus only on the eﬀects of debt, distinguishing between HIPC and
non-HIPC countries.21 Column 3 shows that bilateral donors do behave diﬀerently in the
case of HIPC as compared to non-HIPC. Speciﬁcally, bilateral grants increase (at the
1% level of signiﬁcance) with the amount of multilateral debt held by HIPC, while, the
amount of bilateral grants is unaﬀected by the multilateral debt share held by non-HIPC.
Moreover, bilateral donors positively react to their own debt share only when it is held
by HIPC as compared to non-HIPC.22
Evidence of a preferential treatment for HIPC is also discovered when we look at
the estimated equation for multilateral grants in column 3. The amount of grants given
by multilateral donors increase (at the 1% level of signiﬁcance) with the amount of
multilateral debt held by HIPC, while the amount of multilateral grants is unaﬀected
by the multilateral debt share in the case of non-HIPC. Moreover, multilateral grants
positively respond to the amount of private debt held by non-HIPC.23
Therefore, the aid policy of both donor groups towards HIPC is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from their aid policy towards non-HIPC. Importantly, debt ownership appears an impor-
19tant determinant of the aid policy of both bilateral and multilateral donors. The amount
of grants provided by bilateral donors signiﬁcantly increases only when both bilateral and
multilateral debt is held by HIPC, while they do not react to the oﬃcial debt shares held
by non-HIPC nor to the private debt share. The same is true for multilateral donors who
increase their grant to HIPC as their debt share increases but do not do the same for
non-HIPC.
The results then provides strong support to the hypothesis of defensive granting:
since the correlation between grants and debt only emerges in the case of HIPC, the
hypothesis of defensive granting appears to oﬀer a more convincing explanation than
humanitarian motivations for the positive link between aid and debt. In fact, even if
HIPC are in more need than other low-income countries, the presence of control variables
and of country-speciﬁce ﬀe c t ss h o u l dc o n t r o lf o rt h i sm o t i v a t i o no fa i d . T h i sk i n do f
perverse incentive is even more serious when associated to the multilaterals which, at the
same time, should lend and monitor the implementation of the reforms associated with
aid ﬂows (e.g., Ramcharan, 2003, Celasun and Ramcharan, 2006, Marchesi and Sabani,
2007).
Table 3 presents estimates of both equation (8) and (9) estimated over a reduced
sample of years now ending in 1999. Since the year 1999 marks the beginning of greater
eﬀort in debt reduction by both bilateral and multilateral lenders, in order to provide a
more robust test of the hypothesis of defensive lending and defensive granting we decided
to replicate the analysis excluding the years after 1999. As Table 3 shows, the results
do not substantially diﬀer. In column 1 of Table 3, however, we can now detect some
(albeit weak) support to the hypothesis of defensive lending by bilateral lenders who now
positively react to the amount of multilateral debt held by HIPC (even if only at the 10%
level of signiﬁcance), conﬁrming what already found by Birdsall et al. (2003).
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
20Finally, comparing the estimates of the two diﬀerent time periods allows us also to
(brieﬂy) comment on the evolution in donors aid-allocation criteria. Comparing Table
2 with Table 3, we do not detect any variation in the size, sign and signiﬁcance in the
coeﬃcient of the variable CPIA for no type of creditors and donors. This result is to some
extent at odds with what previously found by Dollar and Levin (2006) and Claessens et al.
(2009) who, respectively, report that multilateral and bilateral aid began to respond more
to the quality of the policy and the institutional environment in the recipient countries
only in the late 1990s/early 2000s.
I nc o l u m n3a n d4o fT a b l e2 ,t h ec oe ﬃcient of the per capita GDPbecomes signiﬁcant
at the 5% and 1% level of signiﬁcance, respectively. Then there is some evidence that
both bilateral and multilateral donors started to be more reactive with respect to poverty
in the last years of the sample. Finally, the sensitivity of aid allocation to the debt burden
has (slightly) decreased over the years as the coeﬃcients of both multilateral and bilateral
d e b ta r es m a l l e ri ns i z ei nc o l u m n3a n d4o fT a b l e2 ,w i t hr e s p e c tt ot h es a m ec o l u m n s
in Table 3.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have examined the determinants of net loans and grants to low-income
countries, focusing on the heavily indebted and poor ones. We estimate a dynamic panel
of 75 low-income countries, for the period 1982 to 2008, by GLS with country-speciﬁc
eﬀects and time eﬀects. To test the robustness of our results we replicate the analysis
over a reduced sample of years now ending in 1999, that is before a greater eﬀort was
made to provide debt relief.
In the full sample, we ﬁnd that both bilateral and multilateral donors reduce net loans
to HIPC as their debt shares increase (where such “correction” is actually weaker in the
21case of multilateral loans to HIPC). Oﬃcial donors provide more grants as multilateral
debt increases where this eﬀect is signiﬁcant only for HIPC. Overall the aid policy of both
bilateral and multilateral donors appears more generous with HIPC than with non-HIPC
countries.
The estimates of the reduced sample, presents some (weak) evidence of defensive
lending and conﬁrms the evidence of defensive granting. As in Birdsall et al. (2003) we
ﬁnd that higher multilateral debt increases bilateral net loans to HIPC (despite their bad
policy), while multilateral net loans decrease as multilateral debt share increase but such
“correction” is smaller for HIPC (as in the full sample). Furthermore, comparing the
results of the two samples, we do not ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences concerning the changes
in the sensitivity of aid allocation policy to poverty, the debt burden or to the quality of
the policies and the institutions (as it is measured by the CPIA index).
Overall, the results of our analysis clearly show that the amount of aid that HIPC
have received, compared to non-HIPC, have been inﬂuenced by their debt levels. As the
HIPC dummy stands for an indicator of high debt, this evidence suggests that HIPC
have received a preferential treatment just because of their high degree of indebtedness,
thereby supporting the hypothesis of defensive granting. These results are then consistent
with a substitution of grants for loans and the new approach to debt sustainability, but
questions the eﬃciency and selectivity of the aid policy.
Finally, since grants have increased as a share of total aid and they deﬁnitely dom-
inate loans, it is crucial that donors learn how to become more selective in the future.
Speciﬁcally, in the case of HIPC, greater future selectivity implies that donors should not
be aﬀected by the debt shares in their grants allocation decisions. Despite the average
external debt to GDP ratio is now reduced to about 40% (thanks to the great amount
of resources, over 117 billion dollars, allocated under the HIPC and the MDRI Initiative)
HIPC countries are still likely to rely on domestic debt and on non-concessional borrowing
22due to their limited tax revenues, thus limiting their total debt sustainability (Arnone and
Presbitero, 2010). As both bilateral and multilateral grants still account for a signiﬁcant
fraction of resource inﬂows into HIPC countries (each around 5% of the GDP, in 2008)
it is then crucial that accumulating new debt (after debt relief) will not distort again
donors’ behavior.
NOTES
1. After 15 years from the beginning of the HIPC Initiative (in 1996) the evidence
on the eﬀects of debt cancellation is not very encouraging. Debt relief has done little to
improve the long-run ﬁscal sustainability in HIPC countries (Burnside and Fanizza, 2005).
Moreover, debt relief seems more likely to be eﬀective in enhancing economic growth and
ﬁscal disciplines only in countries with good institutions (Arnone and Presbitero, 2010).
2. In a preliminary version of this paper (Marchesi and Missale, 2007) we estimated a
similar model over the same (reduced) time period. The sample of countries was however
slightly diﬀerent and the results were, to some extent, diﬀerent too. However, they also
pointed to an overall "mixed" evidence, concerning the hypotheses of defensive lending
(and defensive granting).
3. Multilateral donors include the IFI (IMF, World Bank and other regional develop-
ment banks) and other multilateral and intergovernmental agencies while bilateral donors
include governments and their agencies and oﬃcial export credit agencies.
4. As data on IMF net loans were not originally included in the long-term multilateral
net loans we had to add them to the series.
5. In 2005, following the G8 meeting at Gleneagles, donors pledged to cancel the
whole debt held by the IDA, the IMF and the African Development Fund of the countries
that reached completion point under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.
236. Foreign aid is usually associated with Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA),
which includes both oﬃcial grants and oﬃcial concessional loans (that is loans with at
least a 25% percent grant component). ODA statistics are produced by the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. In turn, ODA can be divided into a bilateral
and a multilateral component, which accounts for about 2/3 and 1/3 of all the resources,
respectively (see Renard and Cassimon, 2001).
7. Technical assistance relates to short and long-term experts from the donor coun-
tries working in developing countries, scholarship programmes and some other forms of
human capital contributions.
8. Bilateral grants have been higher than multilateral grants throughout the whole
period, the diﬀerence between the two, however, substantially reduced in the second half
of the 2000s.
9. As Easterly (2002) puts it, the central paradox of the HIPC is that they became
indebted after two decades of partial debt relief and concessional (oﬃcial) lending. Oﬃcial
lenders did not seem to follow the same prudential rules as private capital, which pulled
out of HIPC; they may have given new loans to enable the old loans to be paid back.
10. Short-term loans have been a small share of total loans for the period under
investigation.
11. In this paper we do not examine the determinants of debt forgiveness due to the
poor quality of the data (on this see Renard and Cassimon, 2001).
12. The group of HIPC has changed several times, since the beginning of the ﬁrst
Initiative in 1996 and the various debt relief programs have evolved over time. In this
paper we choose the HIPC classiﬁcation after the Enhanced HIPC in 1999. Our results,
however, will be consistent using diﬀerent HIPC classiﬁcation. Diﬀerent speciﬁcations are
available upon request.
2413. Controlling for the lagged value of loans removes the natural correlation arising
between current loans and previous period debt (i.e., previous period loans accumulate
to a stock of debt).
14. The use of population is standard in the aid literature, where it is found that
countries with a greater population receive less aid, probably because aid is more eﬀective
when given to small countries (e.g., see Alesina and Dollar, 2000).
15. Barro and Lee (2005) ﬁnd that IMF loans tend to be more frequent and larger
when a country is more connected politically and economically to the United States and
major European countries. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) ﬁnd that countries serving on
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) r e c e i v em o r eU n i t e dN a t i o n sD e v e l o p m e n t
Project support and direct foreign aid from the United States; Dreher et al. (2009a and
2009b) report the same for the IMF and for the World Bank.
16. We will not present these results and we will stick with our “base” speciﬁcation
but diﬀerent speciﬁc a t i o n sa r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
17. For instance, Burnside and Dollar (2000) ﬁnd that the quality of a country’s
policy has only a small impact on the allocation of aid, at least for bilateral donors which
seem more respondent to donor interests. On the contrary, multilateral aid is allocated
to countries with better policies.
18. The importance of population in explaining multilateral loans could be explained
by the systemic importance of a single country (the so called “too big to fail” argument).
19. To the contrary, bilateral donors do not respond to the amount of private debt.
20. Speciﬁcally, columns 1-4 of Table A4 replicate Table 3 using OLS under a static
speciﬁcation (with a correlation of the ﬁrst order in the residuals), columns 5-8 show
the dynamic speciﬁcation using OLS, while columns 9-12 show the dynamic speciﬁcation
25using GMM. In the last two columns, while the size is similar, the degree of signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcient of multilateral debt is lower (about 12%) than in all other speciﬁcations.
21. With the only exception of GDP growth which becomes not signiﬁcant in column
3 of Table 3.
22. Even if the coeﬃcient of the bilateral debt stock which is held by HIPC is
signiﬁcant only at the 10% level of signiﬁcance.
23. As above, bilateral donors are unaﬀected by the private debt share.
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Private debtTable 1: Net Loans and Grants, GLS, 1982-2008
Bilateral Multilateral Bilateral Multilateral
Loans Loans Grants Grants
Multilateral Debt (-1) 0.001 -0.009*** 0.006** 0.006***
(0.401) (-3.931) (2.221) (3.350)
Bilateral Debt (-1) -0.009*** -0.002** 0.002 -0.0003
(-6.050) (-1.997) (1.494) (-0.400)
Private Debt (-1) 0.006*** 0.005*** -0.0004 0.003***
(4.297) (2.890) (-0.159) (2.629)
GDP Growth (-1) -0.003 0.006 -0.008* -0.008**
(-0.998) (1.377) (-1.714) (-2.571)
Per capita GDP (-1) -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.001* -0.001***
(-0.804) (-0.766) (-1.715) (-3.731)
CPIA (-1) -0.001** 0.003*** 0.00009 -0.0004
(-2.005) (4.693) (0.142) (-1.055)
Population 0.018 0.035** 0.038 -0.009
(1.570) (2.458) (1.470) (-0.541)
Bilateral Net Loans (-1) 0.479***
(22.62)
Multilateral Net Loans (-1) 0.438***
(20.67)
Bilateral Grants (-1) 0.646***
(33.13)
Multilateral Grants (-1) 0.501***
(19.37)
Number of countries 75 75 75 75
Number of years 28 28 28 28
R-squared 0.750 0.600 0.570 0.590
Observations 1747 1747 1748 1746
Generalised least squares allowing for heteroskedastic errors. Each equation contains country 
z statistics are in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,  *** significant at 1%.
dummies and time dummies.
Table(s)Table 2: Net Loans and Grants: HIPC vs Non HIPC, GLS, 1982-2008
Bilateral Multilateral Bilateral Multilateral
Loans Loans Grants Grants
HIPC x Multilater. Debt (-1) 0.001 -0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.344) (-2.792) (2.806) (4.042)
HIPC x Bilateral Debt (-1) -0.009*** -0.002** 0.003* -0.0004
(-5.311) (-2.199) (1.914) (-0.497)
HIPC x Private Debt (-1) 0.006** 0.0004 -0.004 0.003
(1.992) (0.184) (-1.233) (1.369)
Non HIPC x Multilateral Debt (-1) 0.001 -0.049*** -0.004 -0.001
(0.188) (-7.882) (-0.771) (-0.338)
Non HIPC x Bilateral Debt (-1) -0.009*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.0002
(-2.883) (-0.900) (-1.323) (-0.168)
Non HIPC x Private Debt (-1) 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.006 0.004**
(3.269) (4.797) (1.191) (2.569)
GDP Growth (-1) -0.003 0.004 -0.007 -0.008***
(-1.005) (0.891) (-1.484) (-2.658)
Per capita GDP (-1) -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.001** -0.001***
(-0.816) (-0.859) (-2.113) (-3.824)
CPIA (-1) -0.001** 0.003*** 0.00006 -0.0005
(-1.971) (5.154) (0.0899) (-1.114)
Population 0.017 0.026* 0.045 -0.009
(1.514) (1.690) (1.618) (-0.581)
Bilateral Net Loans (-1) 0.479***
(22.58)
Multilateral Net Loans (-1) 0.438***
(20.94)
Bilateral Grants (-1) 0.636***
(32.32)
Multilateral Grants (-1) 0.492***
(19.01)
Number of countries 75 75 75 75
Number of years 27 27 27 27
R-squared 0.750 0.600 0.570 0.590
Observations 1747 1747 1748 1746
Generalised least squares allowing for heteroskedastic errors. Each equation contains country 
z statistics are in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,  *** significant at 1%.
dummies and time dummies.Table 3: Net Loans and Grants: HIPC vs Non HIPC, GLS, 1982-1999
Bilateral Multilateral Bilateral Multilateral
Loans Loans Grants Grants
HIPC x Multilater. Debt (-1) 0.004* -0.010*** 0.016*** 0.011***
(1.717) (-3.018) (3.892) (3.278)
HIPC x Bilateral Debt (-1) -0.013*** -0.002* 0.007*** -0.001
(-5.344) (-1.753) (3.183) (-0.551)
HIPC x Private Debt (-1) 0.009* 0.002 -0.013** 0.005
(1.937) (0.478) (-2.160) (1.451)
Non HIPC x Multilateral Debt (-1) 0.011 -0.054*** 0.011 -0.008
(1.373) (-6.028) (1.413) (-1.341)
Non HIPC x Bilateral Debt (-1) -0.008** -0.002 -0.006* -0.001
(-1.981) (-0.761) (-1.690) (-0.815)
Non HIPC x Private Debt (-1) 0.002 0.017*** 0.009 0.006
(0.604) (4.074) (1.208) (1.536)
GDP Growth (-1) -0.004 0.004 -0.016*** -0.015***
(-1.008) (0.873) (-3.439) (-3.631)
Per capita GDP (-1) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.808) (-1.482) (-0.775) (-0.964)
CPIA (-1) -0.001* 0.003*** 0.0002 -0.0004
(-1.854) (4.057) (0.295) (-0.850)
Population 0.130** 0.047 0.089 0.017
(2.555) (1.335) (1.375) (0.417)
Bilateral Net Loans (-1) 0.449***
(16.64)
Multilateral Net Loans (-1) 0.395***
(15.01)
Bilateral Grants (-1) 0.486***
(17.29)
Multilateral Grants (-1) 0.345***
(9.368)
Number of countries 74 74 74 74
Number of years 18 18 18 18
R-squared 0.999 0.795 0.750 0.788
Observations 1096 1096 1096 1096
Generalised least squares allowing for heteroskedastic errors. Each equation contains country 
z statistics are in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,  *** significant at 1%.
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ZambiaTable A2: Variables definition
Variable Definition  Units Source
Bilateral Net Loans Bilateral Net Loan Ratio to GDP GDF (Word Bank)
Multilateral Net Loans Mul Net Loan+IMF Net Loans Ratio to GDP GDF (Word Bank)
Bilateral Grants Bilateral Grants Ratio to GDP DAC (OECD)
Multilateral Grants Multilateral Grants Ratio to GDP DAC (OECD)
Bilateral Debt Long term Bilateral Debt Ratio to GDP GDF (Word Bank)
Multilateral Debt Long term Mul Debt+IMF Debt Ratio to GDP GDF (Word Bank)
Private Debt Long term Bilateral Debt Ratio to GDP GDF (Word Bank)
Gr-GDP Real GDP growth Annual Rate of change Penn Tables 6.2 database
Pc-GDP Real GDP in PPP Ratio to Population (million units) Penn Tables 6.2 database
CPIA  Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Index World Bank
Population Population Billion units Penn Tables 6.2 databaseTable A3: Descriptive statistics (Estimation sample of Table 2)
Variable Mean SD Min Max                                     
Bilateral Net Loans 0.01 0.03 -0.16 0.56
Multilateral Net Loans 0.02 0.03 -0.11 0.25  
Bilateral Grants 0.04 0.05 0 0.85
Multilateral Grants 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.59
Bilateral Debt 0.35 0.48 0 5.78  
Multilateral Debt 0.4 0.42 0 5.85  
Private Debt 0.12 0.21 0 2.57  
Gr-GDP 0.04 0.08 -0.67 1.05  
Pc-GDP 2.42 1.97 0.15 14.54  
CPIA  2.94 0.72 1 4.7  
Population 0.02 0.1 0 1.13  Table A4: Net Loans and Grants, OLS and GMM, 1982-2008
Bilateral Multilateral Bilateral Multilateral Bilateral Multilateral Bilateral Multilateral Bilateral Multilateral Bilateral Multilateral
Loans Loans Grants Grants Loans Loans Grants Grants Loans Loans Grants Grants
Multilateral Debt (-1) -0 009 -0 026*** 0 030*** 0 028*** -0 001 -0 017*** 0 011*** 0 019*** -0 001 -0 019*** 0 009 0 016 Multilateral Debt (-1) -0.009 -0.026*** 0.030*** 0.028*** -0.001 -0.017*** 0.011*** 0.019*** -0.001 -0.019*** 0.009 0.016
(-1.562) (-5.069) (3.689) (6.113) (-0.435) (-5.538) (2.787) (6.849) (-0.209) (-4.162) (1.431) (1.576)
Bilateral Debt (-1) -0.013*** -0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.012*** -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.012*** -0.003 0.002 0.001
(-3.442) (-1.369) (0.606) (1.204) (-5.676) (-0.371) (0.616) (0.300) (-5.356) (-0.800) (0.851) (0.747)
Private Debt (-1) 0.009 0.009* 0.009 0.002 0.005* 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.007** 0.002 0.000
(1 636) (1 775) (1 052) (0 419) (1 683) (1 621) (0 453) (0 293) (1 637) (2 178) (0 501) (0 168) (1.636) (1.775) (1.052) (0.419) (1.683) (1.621) (0.453) (0.293) (1.637) (2.178) (0.501) (0.168)
GDP Growth (-1) -0.011*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.006* -0.004 -0.002 -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.013** -0.008
(-3.288) (-0.235) (-0.140) (-1.756) (-1.248) (-0.783) (-3.219) (-2.756) (-1.575) (-0.832) (-2.103) (-1.477)
Per capita GDP (-1) 0.001 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.005*** 0.001 -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.001 -0.002* -0.002** -0.002***
(0.935) (-0.840) (-3.033) (-4.657) (1.257) (-2.173) (-2.778) (-3.238) (0.519) (-1.908) (-2.049) (-3.211) () () () () () () () () () () () ()
CPIA (-1) -0.004*** 0.006*** -0.002 -0.002* -0.003*** 0.005*** -0.000 -0.001* -0.004 0.005*** 0.000 -0.001
(-2.759) (3.949) (-1.057) (-1.907) (-3.365) (4.884) (-0.292) (-1.686) (-1.595) (3.342) (0.096) (-1.263)
Population 0.078 0.159 0.220 -0.038 0.031 0.060 0.081 -0.006 0.039 0.057*** 0.082 -0.013
(0.615) (1.563) (1.105) (-0.399) (0.636) (1.146) (1.232) (-0.145) (1.139) (2.651) (1.303) (-0.512)
Bilateral Net Loans (-1) 0 573*** 0 568*** Bilateral Net Loans (-1) 0.573*** 0.568***
(28.761) (8.364)
Multilateral Net Loans (-1) 0.423*** 0.392***
(19.425) (8.258)
Bilateral Grants (-1) 0.628*** 0.623***
(32 743) (20 987) (32.743) (20.987)
Multilateral Grants (-1) 0.501***
(22.398) 0.472***
(6.865)
Method static static static static dynamic dynamic dynamic dynamic dynamic dynamic dynamic dynamic
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM GMM GMM GMM
Number of countries 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
Number of years 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Observations 1,674 1,674 1,675 1,673 1,749 1,749 1,750 1,748 1,674 1,674 1,675 1,673
t statistics are in parentheses: * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% t statistics are in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,  *** significant at 1%.